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INTRODUCTION 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 
of Appeals, or White Commission,• ("the Commission") recently issued 
a report and recommendations for Congress and the President after stud-
ying the appellate courts for a year. 2 The Commission investigation em-
phasized the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as 
Congress had instructed. The centerpiece of the Commission's recom-
mendations was a divisional arrangement for the Ninth Circuit and the 
remaining appellate courts as their caseloads increase.3 Notwithstanding 
* Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to thank Michael Higdon, 
Mary LaFrnnce and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions and Jim Rogers for generous, con-
tinuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
I It is referred to as the White Commission because Retired Supreme Court Justice 
Byron R. White chaired it. 
2 See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF AP-
PEALS, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 18, 1998) available at http://app.comm. uscourts.gov /final/app-
struc.pdf I hereinafter CoMM1ss10N REPORT I; see also id. at 93-99 (providing "proposed 
statutes to implement Commission recommendations" on which senators based S.253, 106th 
Cong. (1999)). For analysis of the Commission report and recommendations, see Carl Tobias, 
A Federal Appellate System for the Twenty-First Century, 74 WASH. L. REV. 275, 299-312 
( 1999). 
J See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 40-50, 60-62. For critiques of the divisional 
arrangement which the Commission recommended, see Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest 
Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 
45 
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this focus on the Ninth Circuit, the commissioners compiled a substantial 
amount of objective empirical data and some subjective information on 
the other regional circuits, while proffering additional prescriptions, such 
as two-judge and district court appellate panels for those courts.4 
The Commission also studied and collected considerable material 
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Com-
mission members assessed "two types of cases that have frequently been 
discussed as potential candidates for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, 
including the key reasons advanced for centralized review."5 The com-
missioners submitted these to Congress, without recommendation, "for 
its use as it examines the needs of the federal appellate system in the 
future."6 
The Commission characterized the legislative creation of the Fed-
eral Circuit in 1982 as "the most significant and innovative structural 
alteration in the federal intermediate appellate tier since its establish-
ment."7 Moreover, the commissioners observed that Congress intended 
the Federal Circuit to have exclusive jurisdiction over categories of ap-
peals as to which there would be "a perceived need for centralized, na-
tionwide review" in the future. 8 This essay analyzes those aspects of the 
Commission's investigation, report, and prescriptions that are applicable 
to the Federal Circuit. 
Part I evaluates the background of the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Court of Appeals and the analysis that the 
entity performed. Part II explores the features of the commissioners' in-
vestigation that implicate the Federal Circuit. I find that the information 
which the Commission assembled does not permit conclusive determina-
tions about any of the appellate courts, including the Federal Circuit. 
However, the commissioners examined tax and social security appeals 
for the benefit of senators and representatives, because they may be ap-
propriate, albeit controversial, candidates for Federal Circuit review. 
Additional categories of cases might warrant similar review. Part III, 
therefore, provides suggestions for the future. 
377, 381-93 (2000); Federal Courts-Proposed Changes to the Nilllh Circuit and the Federal 
Courts of" Appeuls, 113 HARV. L. REv. 822, 824-27 (2000) I hereinafter Critique I. 
4 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 62-66. 
5 See id. at 73. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 72; see also Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, tit. I, 
96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. ~ 41 (1994)). See generally 17 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE,~ 4104 (Supp. 1999). For numerous articles discussing the Federal Circuit, see United 
States Court of Appeals j(w the Federal Cirrnit Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 
AM. U. L. REV. 559-1074 (1992). 
x COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. 
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I. BACKGROUND: THE COMMISSION AND ITS WORK 
The origins and development of the Commission on Structural Al-
ternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals require limited assessment in 
this essay, because that background has received considerable scrutiny 
elsewhere.\/ Nevertheless, some examination is appropriate, as the Com-
mission's history is relevant to the investigation undertaken by the Com-
mission, particularly its evaluation of the Federal Circuit. 
Senators and representatives authorized the Commission principally 
in response to continuing controversy that involved the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. rn The enormous magnitude of 
the Ninth Circuit has prompted calls for the court's realignment almost 
since Congress established the appellate system in 1891. 11 Over the 
course of the last eighteen years, members of Congress have orchestrated 
a number of campaigns to restructure the Ninth Circuit. 12 Despite these 
concerted efforts, Congress authorized an assessment in November 
1997 .13 The legislation accorded the commissioners one year to study 
the "structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system, 
with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," and to write a report with 
recommendations for those "changes in circuit boundaries or structure as 
may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of the 
caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent with fundamental 
concepts of fairness and due process." 14 
9 Sl'e, l'.g., Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Structural Alternativl's j(w the Federal 
Court of Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of the Commission's Recommendations fin· the 
Ni111h Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 887, 892-94 (1999): Jennifer E. Spreng, Three Divisions 
in One Circuit? A Critique <>l the Rl'C1immendatio11s ji·om the Commission 011 Strucrura/ Alter-
11atives ji11· the Federal Courts of Appeals, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 553, 554-60 (1999); Carl Tobias, 
Suggestio11s.fi11· S111dyi11g the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REv. 189, 196-214 ( 1997). 
IO COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. See generally Hellman, supra note 3, at 
378-81: NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION Acr OF 1995, S. RES. 104-197, 
I 04th Cong. ( 1995). 
I I See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. See generally Critique, supra note 3, at 
822: Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L. J. 1357, 1363-64 
(1995). 
12 See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997): S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995): S. 948, IOI st Cong. 
( 1989); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34. See generally Jennifer E. 
Spreng, The lceho.r Cometh: A Former Clerk's View <!l the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 
WASH. L. REv. 875, 876-879 ( 1998); Tobias, supra note 2, at 280-94. 
I 3 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2491 (1997) I hereinafter Agencies 
Appropriations Act!. See generally Hellman, supra note 3, at 378-81; Hug, supra note 9, at 
892-94: Spreng, supra note 9, at 560. 
14 Agencies Appropriations Act § 305(a)( I )(B). See generally Tobias, supra note 9, at 
206-11. 
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The commissioners carefully discharged their responsibilities in 
studying the federal appellate courts. 15 During 1998, the Commission 
solicited written public input and conducted six public hearings. 16 How-
ever, the 89 witnesses who testified in those proceedings recommended 
no major reforms for the Federal Circuit. 17 The commissioners also re-
ceived considerable assistance from the Federal Judicial Center 
("FJC") 18 and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
("Administrative Office") 1'\ the federal courts' principal research and 
administrative arms, which Congress empowered the Commission to 
consult.20 Judicial Center employees undertook a number of assessments 
and helped develop surveys that the commissioners circulated to federal 
appeals and district court judges and appellate lawyers, seeking their per-
spectives on circuit operations.21 The Commission also assembled, ana-
lyzed, and synthesized a significant amount of statistical information, 
such as the percentage of cases decided in which the courts hear oral 
arguments or publish an opinion, the amount of time the cou1ts require to 
decide cases, and the measures the courts use to deal with docket 
pressures. 22 
The commissioners reviewed all of the material that they had col-
lected or received and in October 1998 published a tentative draft report 
and recommendations.23 The Commission solicited public comments on 
1.5 In this paragraph, I rely substantially on CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-6; 
Tobias, supra note 2, at 295-98. 
16 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3. See generally Joseph N. Akrotiri-
anakis et al., .lerry-B11ilding the Road to the Future: An Evaluation of the White Commission 
Report mi Structural Altemutives ji1r the Federal Courts of Appeals, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
355, 362 ( 1999). The Commission conducted no hearing in Washington, D.C. where the Fed-
eral Circuit is located: instead members of the Commission met with judges of the Federal 
Circuit and the U.S. Cou11 of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and with representatives of the 
Department of Justice and the White House Counsel's Office, to seek their views on the Fed-
eral Circuit. See CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
17 See generally Spreng, supra note 9, at 562-63. The hearing transcripts indicate also 
that no judges of the Federal Circuit testified. See also Commission on Structural Alternatives 
for the Federal Cou11s of Appeals, Working Papers 343-344 ( 1998) I hereinafter WORKING 
PAPERS I. 
18 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1994) (authorizing the FJC). 
19 28 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (authorizing the Administrative Office). 
2o See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-4: see also Agencies Appropriations Act, 
supra note 13, at § 305(a)(4)(D); Hug, supra note 9, at 893. 
21 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 4; WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 3-
91. See generally Akrotirianakis et al., supra note 16, at 362. 
22 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-25, 39; see also REPORT OF THE FED-
ERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) !hereinafter FCSC REPORT! (stating that 
caseload increases have transformed the circuits). 
23 See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF AP-
PEALS, TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT (Oct. 7, 1998) !hereinafter COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT 
REPORT!. See generally Hug, supra note 7, at 893-94; Spreng, supra note 12, at 877-78; 
Tobias, supra note 2, at 298. 
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the report over a 30-day period.24 However no judges of the Federal 
Circuit tendered comments, and very few individuals or institutions sub-
mitted responses that specifically addressed the court.25 After assessing 
the public comments, the Commission issued a final report and sugges-
tions that differed only minimally from the tentative report.26 The linch-
pin of the commissioners' suggestions was a divisional arrangement for 
the Ninth Circuit and the remaining regional circuits as their caseloads 
increase.27 Particularly relevant to the issues treated in this paper, how-
ever, was the Commission's decision to remove copyright appeals from 
its examination of cases that frequently have been mentioned as possible 
candidates for exclusive Federal Circuit jurisdiction.28 This was the 
most significant difference between the final and draft reports. 29 
The commissioners retained, essentially intact, the tentative draft re-
port's assessment of tax and social security matters as classes of appeals 
that might be added to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, and trans-
mitted the analysis to Congress, without recommendation, for 
lawmakers' use in evaluating the future needs of the federal appellate 
system. 30 The commissioners also gathered considerable information on 
the Federal Circuit. The next section of this essay examines the discus-
sion of the Federal Circuit in the Commission report and the material the 
commissioners assembled on the Federal Circuit. 
II. ANALYSIS: THE COMMISSION'S WORK ON THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
The Commission's information-gathering and report focused prima-
rily on the twelve regional circuits.31 In fact, the Working Papers com-
24 See Tobias, supra note 2, at 298. 
25 For comments on the Commission Report, see http://app.comm.uscourts.gov /report/ 
comments.html. 
26 See CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2. 
27 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at iii., 40-47, 59-76. See generally Hug, supra 
note 9, at 897-98: Spreng, supra note 9, at 577-86: Tobias, supra note 2, at 304-10. 
28 Copyright cases had received a paragraph of discussion in the tentative draft report. 
See COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 23, at 64-65. That discussion was 
omitted in the final report. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73-74. See generally 
Paul Michel, The Court ofAppealsj(1r the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges 
Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1177, 1182 (1999). 
29 The American Intellectual Property Law Association strongly opposed extending Fed-
eral Circuit jurisdiction to include copyright appeals. See Letter from Michael E. Kirk, Execu-
tive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association, to the Commission on 
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998), at http:// 
app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/PropLaw.htm (on file with the Cornell Journal of 
Law and Public Policy). 
30 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-74. See generally Michel, supra note 
28. 
31 See CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. This emphasis comported with the 
Commission's statutory mandate. See also Agencies Appropriations Act, supra note 13. 
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missioned by the commissioners included very little empirical data on 
the Federal Circuit.32 Nevertheless, the Commission assembled some 
empirical data and additional subjective information on the Federal Cir-
cuit, and provided a relatively brief discussion on the Federal Circuit, in 
its report. 33 
A. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
I. Discussion of the Federal Circuit in the Commission Report 
In the introductory paragraph of Chapter Five of the Commission 
Report, titled "Appellate Jurisdiction," the Commission stated that it 
made "no recommendations on what matters should come into the fed-
eral courts."34 However, one Commission member, Circuit Judge Gil-
bert S. Merritt, joined by the Commission chair, Retired Supreme Cou1t 
Justice Byron R. White, wrote separately to propose the substantial mod-
ification of diversity jurisdiction.35 Moreover, the Commission proffered 
several important "recommendations on where and how appellate review 
of some of those matters might be best structured."36 
Even though the commissioners stated that the report emphasized 
the twelve regional circuits, the Commission lauded the Federal Circuit 
as the· most important and creative structural modification in the federal 
intermediate appellate system since its establishment.37 The Commis-
sion explained that the Federal Circuit lacks geographical boundaries and 
32 See, e.g., WORKING PAPERS supra note 17, at 93 tbls.1-3. For discussions of increas-
ing interest in the Federal Circuit, see Michel, supra note 28, at 1180-81, 1186-87, 1194; 
Jonathan Ringel, Still Standing. He Finally Takes a Seat, LEGAL TIMES, June 5, 2000, at JO. 
33 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21, 72-74. 
34 Id. at 67 (emphasis in original). The Commission recognized that "significant changes 
need to be made in the jurisdiction of the federal district courts," but a majority of the commis-
sioners seemed constrained by the "statutory charge I against making! recommendations in that 
regard."' The Commission did, however, admonish Congress to exercise "restraint in confer-
ring new jurisdiction on the federal courts." Id. at 6. 
35 See id. at 77-84; see also Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice 
Byron R. White (Oct. 22, 1998), at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/ comments/chiet].pdf 
(commending the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals" 
Draft Report) (on file with the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy). For discussions of 
limitations on federal jurisdiction, see generally FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 35-53; JuD. 
CONF. OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 21-39 (1995) !hereinafter 
LONG RANGE PLAN!; JUDITH MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 141-53 (1993). 
36 CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 67 (emphasis in original). See i:enerally LoNG 
RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 134-35 (discussing alternatives for limiting federal 
jurisdiction). 
37 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & 
CooPER, supra note 7, at* 4104: Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. I ( 1989) (discussing origins of Federal Circuit); Daniel 
J. Meador, The Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 581 
(1992). 
2000] THE WHITE COMMISSION AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 51 
that its jurisdiction is defined in two distinct ways.38 First, the Federal 
Circuit exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over determinations is-
sued by a number of lower courts and administrative entities, including 
the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, the Court 
of Veterans Appeals, and the Merit Systems Protection Board.39 
Second, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over cases in-
volving specific subject matter that arise from all 94 of the federal dis-
trict courts.40 The principal category is comprised of suits for patent 
infringement.41 Otherwise, the Federal Circuit is organized similarly to 
the remaining appellate courts: it has twelve legislatively authorized ap-
pellate judgeships, a clerk of court, and a support staff which includes a 
comparatively small number of central staff attomeys.42 The Federal 
Circuit is the only appeals court that Congress has specifically authorized 
to employ a staff of technical advisors to assist the judges in resolving 
the complicated issues that patent disputes frequently involve.43 
The commissioners also explained why Congress had created the 
Federal Circuit in 1982.44 They stated that senators and representatives 
were not only providing for then-current conditions but also affording the 
federal appellate system a new resource: an appeals court in which Con-
gress could vest exclusive appellate jurisdiction over additional Classes 
of cases as to which the need for centralized review might subsequently 
3X See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See Renerally ConservinR Judicial Re-
sources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Jin· the Second and Eighth Circuits and the First, Third, and Federal Circuits: Hearings 
Before the Subcommillee On Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, I 05th Cong. 104 (1998) (statement of Federal Circuit Chief Judge Glenn L. Archer, 
Jr.) I hereinafter Archer Statement!. 
39 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72; see also Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, *IOI, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
* 41 ( 1994 )). See generally CHARLES E. GRASSLEY' CHAIRMAN. s REPORT ON THE APPROPRI-
ATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, ANALYSIS OF 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT I (1999) !hereinafter FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS!; Michel, supra note 
28, at 1178-79. 
40 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See generally Archer S1atement, supra 
note 38, at 104; WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 7, at§ 4104. 
41 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See generally Archer Statemem, supra 
note 38, at 104: LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 43 (recognizing that centralized review 
is beneficial with regard to technical subject matter); Michel, supra note 28, at 1180-81 (detail-
ing a significant increase in patent cases heard per year from the early 1990s to the late 1990s); 
Victoria Slind-Flor, Federal Circuit Judged Flawed, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 3, 1998, at Al ("The 
nation's dependence on technological innovation has pushed the once obscure U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit center stage."). 
42 See CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See generally Archer Stateme/1/, supra 
note 38, at 104-05 (discussing Federal Circuit staff's small size); FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS, 
supra note 39, at 2. 
43 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See generally Archer Stateme/1/, supra 
note 38, at I 05 (setting out obligations of technical advisors): Slind-Flor, supra note 41 (noting 
presence and role of technical advisors). 
44 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. 
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arise.45 The Commission observed that aff important recommendation 
included in the 1995 Long Range Plan prepared by the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States urged that the appellate function be performed 
"primarily in a generalist court of appeals established in each regional 
circuit; and a Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with nationwide 
jurisdiction in certain subject-matter areas."46 
The commissioners proffered no particular prescriptions regarding 
other categories of cases that Congress could. usefully assign to the Fed-
eral Circuit.47 The commissioners did, however, examine tax and social 
security appeals as two specific classes of cases that are often "discussed 
as potential candidates for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction" and ana-
lyzed the principal reasons that observers of the federal courts have tradi-
tionally articulated for centralized review of these cases.48 The 
Commission transmitted these ideas, absent recommendation, to 
lawmakers to employ when scrutinizing the future needs of the federal 
appellate system.49 
The commissioners first discussed tax cases, observing that at least 
since the mid-twentieth century, judges, attorneys, and legal scholars 
have proposed that appeals in civil matters "arising under the Internal 
Revenue Code be concentrated in one court of nationwide scope."50 
Lawyers and litigants currently take their appeals to the regional appel-
45 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-73. See generally Meador, supra note 37 
(detailing the origins of the Federal Circuit). Congress has assigned the Federal Circuit exclu-
sive jurisdiction over decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals and transferred to the Federal 
Circuit the authority of the Temporary Court of Emergency Appeals ("TECA") after abolish-
ing that court. See CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-73; see also FCSC REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 73 (recommending that TECA cases be reassigned to the Federal Circuit, which 
Congress subsequently did). See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 7, at 
§ 4l05 (discussing the jurisdiction of the TECA). 
46 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73, citing LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 
43 (declining to propose that Congress create "new specialized or subject-matter courts in the 
judicial branch" in part because their benefits would genernlly be less than the '"well-known 
dangers of judicial specialization")): see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 ( 1994) (stating that the Judicial 
Conference is the federal courts' policymaking arm). 
47 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. See generally Michel, supru note 28, at 
1182-83. 
48 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73-74. The final Commission report includes 
essentially verbatim the material the Commission had incorporated in the tentative draft report. 
Compare id. at 72-74 with COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFr REPORT, supra note 23, at 63-65. 
49 See CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. For a similar examination, and more 
specific recommendations, see LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 43. 
50 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. Examples include Oscar E. Bland, Federal 
Tax Appeals, 25 CoLUM. L. REv. 1013 (1925); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of 
Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1153 (1944): H. Todd Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revis-
ited, 85 YALE L.J. 228 ( 1975); Roger John Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure ji1r 
Federal Income and Estate Gift Taxes - A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 CoLUM. L. REV. 1393 
(1938). Bur see James P. Holden, The Federal Courts Study Committee Has Nor Made the 
Case ji>r Its Proposed 01•erhaul of the Tax Litigation Process, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 639, 639-
40 (1991). 
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late courts from the 94 federal district courts and the Tax Court.s 1 Crit-
ics' primary concern with this arrangement is the inequities produced by 
permitting parties to pursue appeals in all twelve regional circuits.s2 For 
instance, citizens in different areas of the United States may sometimes 
be subject to differing tax liabilities.53 Planning is concomitantly com-
plicated because infrequent Supreme Court review of tax cases often 
leaves the interpretation of the tax Jaw unsettled for years.54 
In 1979, the United States Senate Judiciary Committee conducted 
extensive hearings on proposed legislation that would have created a 
Court of Tax Appeals and generated substantial support for the idea.ss 
Moreover, the Federal Courts Study Committee's 1990 report suggested 
that civil tax appeals be centralized in an Article III appellate division of 
the Tax Court.s6 The commissioners admonished, however, that the Fed-
eral Circuit's existence obviates the necessity to create special tribunals 
of this type.57 Should senators and representatives decide to centralize 
tax cases, the Commission concluded, the Federal Circuit would provide 
a readily available forum. The court already adjudicates appeals in tax 
matters that come to it from the Court of Federal Claimssx and could 
5 I See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. The Commission denominated this 
review structure as the "inverted pyramid." Id. See 11eneral/y RoswELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT 
OF FEDERAL TAXES 206 ( 1943); Louis A. Del Cotto, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals: An 
Ar11ument and a Study, 12 BuFF. L. REV. 5 (1962-63). 
52 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73; see also Sandra Jo Craig, Federal In-
come Tax and the Supreme Court: The Case A11ainst a National Court of Tax Appeals, 1983 
UTAH L. REV. 679; Miller, supra note 50, at 230. Bltl see Holden, supra note 50, at 639-40, 
644. 
53 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73; see also Craig, supra note 52: Del 
Cotto, supra note 51, at 6. 
54 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73; see also Del Cotto, supra note 51; Miller, 
supra note 50. But see Holden, supra note 50, at 639-40, 644. 
55 See CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 73; see also Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1979: Hearings on S.677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 46-72 (1979) (statements of 
Erwin Griswold, former Solicitor General and former dean, Harvard Law School; M. Carr 
Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Department of Justice; and Daniel J. 
Meador, Assistant Attorney General, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, 
Department of Justice); Meador, supra note 37, at 610-14 (surveying the relevant history and 
asserting that because of the controversial nature of the Court of Tax Appeals proposal and the 
threat that it might prevent creation of the Federal Circuit, Congress deleted the proposal from 
the bill authorizing the Federal Circuit). 
56 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73-74. '"Article III" judges serve with life 
tenure. See FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 69: see also Holden, supra note 50, at 639. For a 
discussion of the proposal to create an Article III division of the Tax Court and dissenting 
statements, see FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 69-72. 
57 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. See 11enerally LONG RANGE PLAN, 
supra note 35, at 43. 
5 8 CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. But <f Michel, supra note 28, at 1181, 1183 
(questioning the propriety of expanding Federal Circuit jurisdiction generally, and to include 
tax appeals specifically). 
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absorb tax appeals from the Tax Court or all 94 of the federal district 
courts.59 
The Commission examined social security appeals as a second cate-
gory of cases that Congress might place within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Federal Circuit.60 Judges, administrators of the system, and other 
observers had frequently recommended that Congress assign judicial re-
view in social security cases - after final administrative agency action -
to an Article I court, which would relieve federal district courts of the 
task.61 The Commission stated that it had reviewed these proposals but 
made no recommendations, except that "they deserve the serious consid-
eration of Congress."62 Should lawmakers decide to establish an Article 
I court for this purpose, the Commission reasoned, they might wish to 
evaluate "placing exclusive appellate jurisdiction over that court in the 
Federal Circuit."63 The Commission seemed to consider this prospect 
worthwhile, as the Federal Circuit already exercises jurisdiction over de-
terminations of the Court of Veteran Appeals, an Article I court which 
hears all appeals of adverse administrative action by the Veterans Ad-
ministration.64 The commissioners found that similarities between social 
security and veterans' claims would make the placement of appellate re-
view over them in one forum both "sensible and efficient."65 
59 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. In contrast, the American Bar Associa-
tion Section of Taxation opposed centralization of tax appeals in one court. See Letter from 
Stefan F. Tucker, Chair, ABA Commission on Taxation, to Justice Byron R. White. Chair, 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts (Nov. 6, 1998), al http:// 
app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/ABA-ST.pdf. See generally Michel, supra note 28, 
at 1183. 
6o See CoMM1ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. See generally JERRY MASHAW, Bu-
REAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS ( 1983) (evaluating ef-
fectiveness of adjudication of social security disability benefit claims); i11ji·a notes 80-86 and 
accompanying text (analyzing the two studies of social security appeals that the Commission 
commissioned). 
6 I See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. The Federal Courts Study Committee 
proffered a similar recommendation. See FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 55-58. See generally 
Thomas Wilinsky, Me11di11g rhe Safely Ner's Safely Ner: The Federal Courrs Srudy Commir-
ree's Proposal for Reforming rhe Social Sernrity Disahiliry Benejirs Review Process, 18 
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE. 1079 (1990/1991). 
62 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. For examples of proposed legislation, see 
H.R. 4419, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 4647, 99th Cong. (1986). 
63 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. See generally Susan Haire & Stefanie 
Lindquist, An Agency and 12 Courrs: Social Sernriry Disahiliry Cases i11 rhe U.S. Courrs of 
Appeals, 80 JuDICATURE 230 (1997) (analyzing lack of uniformity among circuits and nonac-
quiescence by Social Security Administration in treating social security appeals). 
6 4 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 502 (1994). 
65 CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. If Congress so provided, the "standard of 
review for veterans' appeals," which is limited to questions of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation, would appear appropriate for social security matters. Id. Bur cf Michel, supra 
note 28, at 1181-1183 (questioning the propriety of expanding Federal Circuit jurisdiction). 
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In the tentative draft report, the Commission also discussed copy-
right cases as a potential candidate for Federal Circuit jurisdiction.66 The 
tentative draft report observed that patents and copyrights are linked in 
Article I of the Constitution, which provides for Congress to "promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries."67 Senators and representatives have invoked this au-
thority to pass legislation that governs patents and copyrights, while ob-
servers have frequently emphasized the desirability of having nationally 
uniform law cover both of these important areas.68 Indeed, the commis-
sioners remarked that a perceived need for greater uniformity in the pat-
ent area was a principal motivating factor in the Federal Circuit's 
creation.69 Since that time, technological developments, including com-
puters and electronic data processing, storage, and communication, have 
caused dramatic changes in patents and copyrights, bringing "them to-
gether in ways that were unknown seventeen years ago."70 These devel-
opments have led some observers to suggest that the same court be 
assigned exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright claims.71 This 
discussion of copyright cases, however, was omitted from the final 
report.72 
2. Discussion of the Federal Circuit in the Commission Working 
Papers 
The Federal Circuit received only limited examination in the Work-
ing Papers compiled by the Commission, especially in comparison with 
66 See COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 23, at 64-65. 
6 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, s 8; see also COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 
23, at 64-65. See generally I WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 22-25 (1994) 
(outlining history of the copyright clause in the Constitution). 
68 See COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFf REPORT, supra note 23, at 65. For recent exam-
ples, see Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright 
Court: Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 2I HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 717 
( 1999); Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our Patent System, 37 IDEA 545 ( 1997) 
(criticizing Federal Circuit's bias toward patent holders and claiming that the circuit fails to 
achieve uniformity). 
69 See COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFf REPORT, supra note 23, at 65; Meador, supra note 
37, at 588. 
70 COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 23, at 65 ("Today patents are 
issued for computer software programs that often are also the subject of copyrights."); Michel, 
supra note 28, at 1184-85. 
71 COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFf REPORT, supra note 23, at 65. See generally Landau 
& Biederman, supra note 68, at 774-784 (advocating a national copyright court modeled on 
the Federal Circuit). But cf Michel, supra note 28, at 1181, 1183 (questioning the propriety of 
expanding Federal Circuit jurisdiction generally, and to include copyright appeals 
specifically). 
72 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-74. 
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the amount of empirical data gathered on the twelve regional circuits. 73 
Nevertheless, the Commission did assemble some empirical information 
on the Federal Circuit and commissioned two studies of social security 
appeals, which it published in the Working Papers.74 Moreover, the 
commissioners collected considerable subjective material on the Federal 
Circuit, partly by circulating the Commission survey to judges of the 
court and attorneys who practice before it.75 
A memorandum prepared by a Federal Judicial Center employee 
and included in the Working Papers explained certain case management 
practices in the courts of appeals.76 The memorandum showed, for ex-
ample, that the Federal Circuit is the only circuit in which the staff ap-
pears to play no role in nonargument decision making.77 The Federal 
Circuit typically affords plaintiffs and defendants fifteen minutes for oral 
arguments, a figure similar to the time allotted by numerous other ap-
peals courts.78 The Federal Circuit is one of four appellate courts that 
have "strict noncitation rules" governing the citability of unpublished 
opinions.79 
The commissioners also called for two studies of social security ap-
peals. The first analysis considered whether cases that arise from "deni-
als of social security benefits might be removed from the litigation track" 
that results in their appeal to the twelve regional circuits.80 The assess-
ment's findings were essentially inconclusive. However, the study found 
that the number of federal appeals involving Social Security cases is 
small today, but that "policy shifts and administrative oversight initia-
tives" could substantially increase these cases.81 Therefore, creation of a 
1:. See supra note 31. See generally WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17. 
74 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 245. 
75 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
76 See Judith McKenna, Summw:v <!f' Case Manaiwment Practices and Related Issues, in 
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 101-16: see also Michel, supra note 28, at 1186 (noting 
Judge Michel's opinion that "the court seems to be operating in an increasingly well-organized 
and efficient manner" partly by employing "a variety of efficiency measures to cope with a 
substantial caseload"). 
77 See McKenna, supra note 76, at 106-107. See generally Archer Swtement, supra note 
38, at 104-106 (describing role of Federal Circuit staff and noting impact of increased jurisdic-
tion on staffing requirements). 
7 8 See McKenna, supra note 76, at 109: see also FED. CIR. R. 34, Practice Notes. 
79 McKenna, supra note 76, at 116; see also Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of 
Opinions: One .ludge"s View, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 909, 916-19 (1986) (affording views of a 
Federal Circuit judge on selective publication and citation practices); Michel, supra note 28, at 
1186-87 (presenting another Federal Circuit judge's views on these and related matters); Letter 
from Federal Circuit Chief Judge Haldane Robert Miller to Circuit Judge Will Garwood, 
Chair, Advisory Committee On Appellate Rules (Feb. 25, 1998) (presenting the Federal Cir-
cuit's views on these and related matters). 
8° Kent Sinclair, Appeals in Social Security Cases, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, 
at 245, 247. 
81 Id. at 322. 
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new court structure might be seen as insurance against the possibility of 
expanding Social Security appeals. The study expressed ambivalence, 
however, about whether insulation from the prospect of burgeoning cases 
through this new structure would be sufficient to motivate congressional 
action.82 
The second assessment essentially examined the prospect of creat-
ing an Article I court which would resolve social security cases.83 The 
study discussed relevant statistical information; analyzed how the federal 
courts address Social Security appeals under the present regime; consid-
ered numerous systemic problems, such as the lack of reliable and con-
sistent precedent; and concluded that a single appellate court could better 
administer the corpus of Social Security law.84 The evaluation then re-
viewed the Federal Courts Study Committee's recommendation that 
Congress create an Article I court for Social Security claims85 and fur-
ther limited this committee's suggestions by proposing that appeals from 
this court to the federal appellate courts be permitted only in cases in-
volving constitutional questions.86 
The Commission also assembled considerable subjective material 
on the Federal Circuit by surveying judges who serve on the court and 
lawyers who practice before it.87 Federal Circuit judges generally ex-
pressed satisfaction with the number of judges Congress now autho-
rizes88 and with the performance of the .Federal Circuit's en bane 
process.89 
82 See id. 
83 See Com me ms of Judge John C. Godbold m1 Creation 1(/ an Article I Social Security 
Court, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 325. 
84 The study, while not "a formal survey," was based upon interviews with magistrate 
judges, a court of appeals clerk, and a court of appeals chief staff attorney, as well as research 
and the author's "own perceptions." Id. at 325; see also id. at 325-30. 
85 See id. at 330; see also FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 55-56. 
86 The jurisdiction would be more limited in terms of the types of claims and in terms of 
the issues that could be appealed. See Godbold, supra note 83, at 330-31. See generally LoNG 
RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 43 (discussing possible additions to and subtractions from 
Federal Circuit jurisdiction); supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
87 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 15-35, 72-91. 
88 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 18-21 (surveying judges' opinions). See gen-
erally Archer Statemelll, supra note 38, at 106 (suggesting that "the authorized 12 judgeships 
for the Federal Circuit is about right at this time for the job with which litJ is entrusted."). But 
see FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 3 (stating that "based on the Federal Cir-
cuit's declining caseload and court statistics, serious consideration should be given to whether 
this court can do its work with a smaller complement of judges"). 
89 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 23-25. See generally Slind-Flor, supra note 
41 (presenting positive and negative opinions of judges and lawyers regarding the Federal 
Circuit). 
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Attorneys who responded to the questionnaire voiced considerable 
satisfaction with the perforn1ance of the Federal Circuit.9° For example, 
among all the appeals courts, the Federal Circuit had the smallest per-
centage of respondents who indicated that they had a moderate or greater 
problem securing needed oral argument or with the court's reliance on 
visiting judges on argument panels.9 1 However, the proportion of attor-
neys who considered the "difficulty of discerning circuit law due to con-
flicting precedents" as significant was nearly the highest in the Federal 
Circuit, second only to the Ninth Circuit.92 Moreover, the percentage of 
respondents who suggested that "restriction on citation to unpublished 
opinions was a moderate or greater problem" was fourth highest in the 
Federal Circuit.93 
B. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 
of Appeals collected some objective and considerable subjective material 
on the Federal Circuit, which improves understanding of the court today. 
The commissioners provided much relevant data and many valuable in-
sights, implying that the Federal Circuit dispenses justice and operates 
well by expeditiously resolving cases.94 Despite this helpful contribu-
tion, however, the study lacks the requisite refinement and breadth to 
support definitive determinations about the Federal Circuit. Much of the 
data which could most convincingly show the court delivers justice or 
functions well in fact remains unclear. For example, that attorneys find 
the Federal Circuit holds oral arguments in an adequate number of ap-
peals offers little guidance about how the court operates.95 Comparing 
these ideas and material among all the appeals courts seems equally un-
informative, because the cases, resources, and responses to docket 
growth differ in each circuit. The peculiar nature of the technical issues 
90 See WORKING PAPERS, supru note 17, at 72-91; see also supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text. 
91 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 105 tbl.3c, 108 tbl.6b. 
92 IJ. at 86, Item 20g; see also id. at 87, Item 20j (showing that the court was second 
highest in the category in which "unpredictability of results until the panel's identity is known" 
is a "grave problem"). For additional discussion of these issues, see Hellman, supra note 3, at 
398-99; Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit 
Jurisprudencej(Jr the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1231 (1994); Michel, supra note 28, at 
1191-93; Slind-Flor, supra note 41, at A 1, 16. 
93 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 113 tbl.12; see also supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text (suggesting that the Federal Circuit's "strict noncitation rules" might explain this 
survey result); Michel, supra note 28, at 1186-87 (discussing those rules); Hellman, supra note 
3, at 399 (suggesting the "need for caution in interpreting the survey results"). 
94 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 77, Item 13; accord Michel, supra note 28, at 
1186. 
95 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 86, Item 20h. 
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often raised by appeals in the Federal Circuit also complicates this 
situation. 96 
The Commission aptly observed that the varied amount of detail in 
"without comment" dispositions and diverse record-keeping methods 
prevent reliable comparisons of the appeals courts along this dimension 
using nationally reported data.97 Even if the existing information were 
clearer, the material might not accurately capture overall circuit opera-
tions which encompass a spectrum ranging from rather mundane daily 
court administration, to the esoteric concept of judicial collegiality.98 
The Federal Circuit's present condition, thus, might resist precise charac-
terization without the collection, analysis, and synthesis of additional and 
more refined material through, for example, the scrutiny of numerous 
cases.99 
In fairness, the commissioners did not claim that they thoroughly 
examined individual courts or considered all relevant empirical data. In-
stead, the Commission explored some benefits and disadvantages of en-
1 argi ng Federal Circuit jurisdiction without proffering 
recommendations. wo For example, it is useful to have opinions that the 
Federal Circuit performs effectively and that tax and social security ap-
peals might be assigned to the court. However, these perspectives are 
somewhat controversial and could be tested empirically or more easily 
understood with carefully assembled empirical data. 
The objective information and the subjective material which the 
commissioners collected lack sufficient refinement and comprehensive-
ness to support concrete determinations about how the Federal Circuit 
operates and whether the court's jurisdiction warrants expansion. None-
theless, this information is adequate to substantiate several specific rec-
ommendations for future action. 
96 See Michel, supra note 28, at 1186: see also Ringel, supra note 32, at I 0 (quoting U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce's characterization of the comparison between caseloads of the Federal 
Circuit and the regional circuits as •·apples to oranges"). 
97 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 111. This phenomenon and diverse case complex-
ity suggest the need to refine data. The Commission refines some data. For instance, the 
commissioners do not consider a circuit's senior judges as visitors. See id. at I 08 tbl.6a. 
98 See generally FRANK M. CoFFIN, ON APPEAL 215 (1994) (offering a '"hombook" defi-
nition of collegiality); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Cir-
cuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1358-64 (1998) (describing role of collegiality in decisional 
processes); Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 585 
(1995) (analyzing impact of collegiality on judicial decision making). 
99 For claims that the coun works well under the current system, see Michel, supra note 
28, at 1186. BUI cf Helen Wilson Nies, State of the Coun, Address Before the Eleventh An-
nual Judicial Conference of the United States Coun of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (June 
18, 1993), in 153 F.R.D. 177, 185 ( 1993) (discussing both positive and negative aspects of the 
work of the coun). 
IOO See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-74. 
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III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The Commission provides a balanced, albeit rather circumscribed, 
analysis of the benefits and disadvantages of including new categories of 
appeals within Federal Circuit jurisdiction. The commissioners' decision 
to discuss two candidates absent suggestion is informative, but treatment 
in greater detail could have further advanced the inquiry. For example, 
several important developments will apparently foster much patent law 
litigation in the near future. These include rapid, dramatic change in 
numerous areas of technology, including electronic commerce and bio-
technology, as well as a broader interpretation of statutory subject matter, 
leading to controversial patents for biotechnology, software, and business 
methods. 101 The Commission was, and Congress should be, cautious 
about expanding the jurisdiction of a court that may soon experience sub-
stantial docket growth.1°2 
Transferring case.s to the Federal Circuit would probably afford cer-
tain general benefits. For instance, diverting a number of appeals from 
the twelve regional circuits would somewhat relieve their burgeoning 
dockets. Moreover, vesting jurisdiction over these cases in the Federal 
Circuit may capitalize on specialized expertise that judges of this court 
now have or would secure by virtue of having a comparatively narrow 
caseload. This approach might, however, afford minimal gain and even 
entail certain disadvantages. Transferring appeals to the Federal Circuit 
from the regional circuits would effect no actual reduction in filings; the 
appellate judiciary as a whole would continue processing the identical 
total number of cases. The new cases may concomitantly burden the 
Federal Circuit at a time when it is experiencing docket growth. 
Judges of the Federal Circuit have no particular expertise in resolv-
ing social security disputes and have limited expertise in deciding tax 
matters. Both social security and tax appeals differ significantly from 
those cases that the court currently receives. Therefore, vesting the Fed-
eral Circuit with jurisdiction over these two categories of cases may not 
expedite appeals, yield systemic economies, or be fairer to litigants. 103 If 
101 See, e.g., AT&T v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F. 3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
1999), cer/. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999) ("IAI mathematical algorithm may be an integral part 
of patentable subject matter such as a machine or process if the claimed invention as a whole is 
applied in a 'useful' manner"); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 
Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (rejecting the notion 
that business methods and computer algorithms are unpatentable per se); Animal Legal Def. 
Fund v. Quigg, 932 F. 2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See generally Landau & Biederman, supra 
note 68 (discussing the complexities of copyright for courts); Michel, supra note 28, at 1184-
85 (noting that scientific and business advances will elicit calls for increased specialization of 
the Federal Circuit). 
I 02 See Michel, supra note 28. at 1181-83, 1193-94. 
103 See U.S. Department of Justice, Comment on the Tentative Draft Report of the Com-
mission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998), at http:// 
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Congress expands the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, it might include 
cases most similar to those the court presently resolves. In short, al-
though social security and tax controversies are oft-mentioned candi-
dates, they may not be the best prospects; Congress might want to assess 
them more closely or explore other possibilities."14 
The Commission's decision to delete from the final report its dis-
cussion of copyright cases in the tentative draft report seems sensible. 105 
Judges of the Federal Circuit have little specialized expertise in this field, 
which minimally overlaps with patent law, while the twelve regional cir-
cuits, and in particular the Second Circuit, have traditionally resolved 
copyright cases. 106 Moreover, technological growth in the internet and 
software, as well as the increasing complexity of Title I 7 of the United 
States Code, mean that there will be greater and increasingly complicated 
copyright litigation in the future. 107 Given the Federal Circuit's current 
areas of expertise, Congress should probably not give it responsibility for 
these complex cases. 
The Federal Circuit and Congress might also consider implementing 
additional actions. Because the commissioners devoted so much atten-
tion to the remaining appeals courts, especially the Ninth Circuit, the 
Federal Circuit warrants greater study. Further analysis would help de-
termine the propriety of vesting in the court jurisdiction over tax, social 
security, and other cases. Indeed, the Judicial Conference Long Range 
Planning Committee admonished that the "need for centralized review by 
the Federal Circuit in any subject area might be reevaluated from time to 
time in light of developments in the law and changes in the workload and 
structure of the other courts of appeals." 108 The Federal Circuit and 
lawmakers may wish to assess those areas in which the court might per-
form better, as suggested by responses to the Commission survey. 109 
Consistency and predictability in circuit law should be considered, al-
app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/DOJ.htm. See generally Tobias, supra note 8, at 234 
(reviewing past and present external reforms in the federal appellate system); Wilinsky, supra 
note 61, at I 087 (noting that vesting federal jurisdiction would not necessarily help social 
security benefits litigants). 
104 Cases involving intellectual property law are one possibility. 
I 05 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
I06 See Douglas Y' Barbo, The Origin of the Confemporw}' Standard for Copyright ln-
ji"ingement, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 285, 285 (1999). 
I 07 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Of course, placing jurisdiction in the Fed-
eral Circuit would be responsive to the concerns about inconsistency and forum shopping that 
plagued patent attorneys when the Hruska Commission surveyed them in 1975. See, e.g., Litt-
man, supra note 68; see also supra note 69. 
!08 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 43. 
109 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 5-91. 
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though they are somewhat elusive notions. Several studies of these con-
cepts, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, should be instructive. 110 
If evaluation shows that the Federal Circuit presently encounters 
difficulties requiring remediation, evaluators must attempt to delineate 
exactly why. This will facilitate the careful tailoring of solutions to ex-
isting circumstances. For instance, should analysis reveal that circuit law 
is not uniform or predictable; the court may want to implement or refine 
promising approaches. These include the circulation of opinions to all 
circuit judges before a final opinion is published, which some regional 
circuits have successfully employed. 111 The court might also consider 
experimenting with additional measures that may promote efficiency, 
such as the "pilot reforms" explored by Judge Michel. 112 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 
of Appeals has collected considerable objective and subjective informa-
tion on the Federal Circuit. However, that material is neither sufficiently 
refined nor thorough to permit definitive conclusions about the court. 
Therefore, Congress and the Federal Circuit judges should continue stud-
ying the Federal Circuit, particularly by exploring potential candidates 
for inclusion within the court's jurisdictions. 
I Io See Mc Kenna, supra note 76. at 93-95; Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency 
in the Law of the Large Cirrnit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 55-9<i (Arthur Hellman ed., 1990); Arthur 
D. Hellman, Precedent, Predicta/Jiliry, and Federal Appel/are Strnclllre, 60 U. P1TT. L. REV. 
1029 ( 1999). 
11 I See, e.g., 3D C1R. 1.0.P. 5.6: 4TH Cm 1.0.P. 36.2; see also Slind-Flor, supra note 41 
(noting that the circuit uses prepublication circulation among technical advisors); N1NTH CIR. 
EVALUATION COMM., INTERIM REPORT 8-12 (2000) (pointing out that case management attor-
neys in the 9th Circuit circulate pre-publication reports daily). 
112 Michel, supra note 28, at 1200-02. Judge Michel suggests a number of "pilot re-
forms," including unsigned or per curiam opinions that tersely declare the essential rationale 
agreed to by the three members of the panel (which would reduce the delays of lengthy, signed 
opinions), and shorter oral opinions from the bench, supplemented later by more detailed writ-
ten opinions. Id. 
